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The Judicial Sensibility of the WTO Appellate Body 
 
A Response to Howse, ‘The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global 
Governance by Judiciary’ 
 
Andrew Lang
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Abstract 
 
When the World Trade Organization’s new dispute settlement machinery was created 
in 1995, no one knew for certain what its consequences would be. Innovative and 
experimental in crucial respects, it represented an extraordinary gambit by the 
Uruguay Round negotiators, who agreed to its creation partly out of frustration with 
the perceived deficits of the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade’s enforcement 
machinery, partly out of fear of unilateralism and partly in the context of a particular 
moment of post-Cold War faith in the international rule of law. Although a mythology 
very quickly emerged around this new dispute settlement machinery, according to 
which it represented a step-change from power-oriented to rule-oriented trade 
diplomacy, this was in truth always more of an aspirational expression rather than a 
statement of fact. In the mid-1990s, the new system had many possible futures, and its 
historical meaning was yet to be made. No one was more conscious of this than the 
seven original members of the Appellate Body, who understood well the stakes of 
their endeavour and felt very keenly the scrutiny of the international community as it 
watched how this institutional experiment would unfold. 
 
Over the last 20 years, there has been no keener or more clear-eyed observer of the 
Appellate Body than Robert Howse. He has been there from the beginning, following 
closely the evolution of its complex jurisprudence and playing a major role in the 
debates to which this jurisprudence has given rise. In his EJIL Foreword article, 
Howse brings his decades of experience to offer a subtle and sophisticated reading of 
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the Appellate Body’s trajectory from its inception to the present day.1 There is, in 
truth, no match for this article in existing World Trade Organization (WTO) 
scholarship – indeed, few have attempted a narrative of such comprehensive scope, 
ranging over the entire historical sweep of the Appellate Body’s activity and covering 
key developments in the jurisprudence under most of the key WTO agreements. It is a 
formidable achievement. 
The narrative that Howse tells is – appropriately, given the professional 
responsibilities of a legal scholar – critical of the Appellate Body in some important 
respects. But, taken as a whole, his story is, by genre, a hero’s tale as much as 
anything, with the Appellate Body taking the starring role. The subtitle, ‘Global 
Governance by Judiciary’, is clearly carefully judged. Howse describes a world in 
which the Appellate Body cautiously, incrementally, but, ultimately, powerfully, 
carves out its own position as an actor in the field of international trade and, indeed, 
takes a leadership role in reshaping the project of economic integration in response to 
contemporary events. In some ways, according to Howse, the Appellate Body has 
fallen into this role or has at least been pushed into it by circumstances. From an early 
position of vulnerability, in the context of both internal and external legitimacy crises, 
with only the limited tools of the jurisprude at its disposal, it has somehow managed 
to build its own reputation and institutional strength and even to provide stability to 
the WTO system as a whole even as the costs and benefits of international economic 
integration have been fundamentally challenged.  
In this response, I do not attempt to critique Howse’s article – as it happens, I 
have few serious disagreements with the core of the story he tells. Instead, my aim is 
to offer a series of reflections prompted by Howse’s rich narrative, including 
highlighting points of special interest that, in my view, deserve particular emphasis 
and perhaps further elaboration and noting some of the questions and challenges for 
international trade lawyers that are called forth with special urgency by Howse’s 
powerful analytic. 
Let me turn first to what I see as the heart of Howse’s story, namely the claim 
that the Appellate Body has acted to ‘soften or blunt’, perhaps even to resist, the neo-
liberal project of “deep integration” that transformed the field of international trade 
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law during the 1990s.
2
 The Uruguay Round agreements, in Howse’s telling, were a 
reflection of this neo-liberal project: they reflected a policy agenda deeply influenced 
by ‘the predominant economic ideology represented by the Washington Consensus’,3 
including ‘expansive intellectual property protection to spur innovation; de-
monopolization and deregulation of network service industries … scaling down 
government health and safety and environmental regulation to what could strictly be 
justified under cost/benefit analysis and by “sound” science’.4  In the years after these 
agreements came into effect, he notes, there was always the strong possibility that the 
Appellate Body would see its role ‘as the ultimate guardian of the new WTO system 
and its neo-liberal values’.5  
Crucially, however, it did not. With one eye on the external criticisms of the 
WTO that arose from the late 1990s and another on the ‘malaise, self-doubt and self-
flagellation’ of the insider WTO community,6 the Appellate Body crafted a different 
role for itself, self-consciously distancing itself from the WTO as an institution.
7
 By 
underscoring the character the WTO agreements as ‘a kind of fundamental balance or 
equilibrium between an inherent right to regulate and specific disciplines on its use’,8 
the Appellate Body imagined its own role primarily as preserving that equilibrium – 
and not as the mouthpiece of free trade values in their neo-liberal form.
9
 A key 
consequence of this approach, for Howse, is the way that the Appellate Body came to 
interpret the new, ‘post-discriminatory’ obligations introduced in a number of 
Uruguay Round texts as consistent with – and, indeed, largely coterminous with – the 
original regulatory provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) itself.
10
 Importantly, Howse suggests that the Appellate Body’s approach 
was ‘very much inspired by or anchored in’ the ‘post-war embedded liberalism’ of the 
‘original GATT’.11 
The core argument is a persuasive one and is substantiated by reference to an 
abundance of case law. Noticing the importance of the Appellate Body’s core initial 
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move – that is to say, its move of imagining the WTO agreements not as a reflection 
of ‘free trade values’ in some simple sense but, rather, as a balance or equilibrium 
between different values – is a wonderful and powerful insight. It may now seem so 
much like second nature to many trade lawyers that we forget what a relatively recent 
invention it is and that it was by no means pre-ordained. But while I agree with the 
overall thrust of this argument, there are two aspects in which my emphasis would 
differ.  
The first has to do with the characterization of the Appellate Body’s approach 
as anchored in post-war embedded liberalism. While it is true, as Howse argues in 
section 6.B of his article, that the Appellate Body has read the post-discriminatory 
obligations in ways that assimilate them to the original GATT non-discrimination 
norms, what also needs to be emphasized is that these original GATT non-
discrimination norms have themselves been reinterpreted at the same time. The result 
of the Appellate Body’s approach, then, has not been a simple return to the embedded 
liberal compromise found in GATT but also the crafting of something new. 
As all WTO lawyers know, there has always been an important disagreement 
within GATT/WTO law over the appropriate interpretation of the non-discrimination 
“package” contained in GATT Articles III and XX. Without wishing to oversimplify 
the debate, the core choice has been between a school of thought that sees non-
discrimination primarily as a norm of anti-protectionism and another school that 
views non-discrimination as competitive neutrality. While these competing 
interpretations may in many cases produce similar results, they proceed on the basis 
of very different visions of the proper role of WTO dispute settlement. To put the 
contrast most simply, where the former sees the primary purpose of the WTO as 
disciplining governments that seek to “cheat” by providing an unfair competitive 
advantage to home grown products, the latter sees the WTO as engaged in a much 
broader project of disciplining regulatory design more generally, by ensuring that all 
competitive disadvantages suffered by imports as a result of regulatory measures are 
carefully scrutinized and strictly justified. 
As I have described elsewhere, there have been twists and turns in the GATT 
non-discrimination jurisprudence as one or the other school of thought has been 
reflected in this or that decision.
12
 Broadly speaking, however, there has been a shift 
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over time from the former interpretation (focused on protectionism) to the latter 
(focused on competitive neutrality). An understanding of non-discrimination as anti-
protection was dominant during the early decades of GATT, but the tide began to 
turn, slowly and inconsistently, from about the 1990s onwards. During its first 10 or 
15 years, the Appellate Body did not consistently hew to one approach, but over the 
last five or so years, the picture has cleared somewhat. In most of the big cases 
involving domestic ‘non-trade’ regulation over the last few years, we have seen a 
clear movement towards an approach to non-discrimination focused on the existence 
and justification of measures that cause competitive distortions. The hallmarks of this 
approach are – exactly as Howse describes – a combination of three primary moves: 
first, a relatively straightforward finding of discrimination based primarily on the 
existence of a detrimental impact on the competitive position of imports; second, 
considerable deference to the collective values and goals reflected in the regulatory 
measure at issue; and, third, heightened scrutiny of the design of the measure (the 
regulatory “means”) to determine if the competitive distortion is strictly justified.  
A number of recent major cases illustrate the way in which the Appellate 
Body has been willing to embrace a role in which it engages in careful scrutiny of 
rationality of the design of the domestic regulation, even as it exhibits deference to 
regulatory goals. Thus, in US – Tuna II (and the more recent Article 21.5 decision in 
the same case), the ability of the USA to put in place a labelling regime to promote 
dolphin conservation was reaffirmed, even as the Appellate Body found against the 
USA on the basis of an extremely fine-grained analysis of the way in which the 
labelling regime was designed and applied.
13
 In US – Clove Cigarettes, the same basic 
approach was adopted, with the Appellate Body explicitly affirming the importance of 
WTO members’ ability to restrict the sale of flavoured cigarettes for reasons of public 
health, while seeing no justification for exempting menthol cigarettes from the scope 
of the regulation.
14
 In EC – Seal Products, it was accepted that the moral concerns of 
European consumers over seal hunting techniques in other countries constitute a 
perfectly permissible basis for adopting even severe trade restrictions, but the 
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European Union (EU) was pulled up failing to design and apply the restrict import 
regime in question in a scrupulously and demonstrably objective and even-handed 
way.
15
 And in Canada – Feed-in-Tariff, the Appellate Body appeared to go out of its 
way to establish that support for renewables was not WTO inconsistent per se and 
that the problematic aspect of the measure was the clearly discriminatory on local 
content  contained in the design of the measures.
16
  
In many ways, this is merely to repeat the interpretation of the jurisprudence 
that Howse offers in his article.
17
 The point, however, is that this is not quite a return 
to the regulatory balance represented by the ‘post-war embedded liberalism’ of the 
original GATT.
18
 It is certainly true, as Howse notes, that this approach represents a 
turning away from a project of ‘deep integration’ based on regulatory harmonization 
and the disciplining of regulation through cost-benefit analysis. But it is not a return 
to the past; it is something new. Non-discrimination is now imagined rather 
differently from the way it was imagined in post-war embedded liberalism, not as a 
tool to stamp out ‘cheating’ and to constrain protectionist forces but, rather, as a 
means of disciplining regulatory arbitrariness and promoting better designed, tightly 
focused and more efficient regulation. In my view, this is new – an invention of the 
Appellate Body that represents a deft middle ground between a truly neo-liberal 
model (at least in the sense of ‘neo-liberal’ used by Howse)  and the embedded liberal 
model of the mid-20th century.  
The second aspect of Howse’s story I would want to elaborate has to do with 
the characterization of the Uruguay Round texts as fundamentally allied to a neo-
liberal view of economic integration. Howse makes very clear that, in order to adopt 
the above approach, the Appellate Body has had to distance itself from the ‘WTO as 
an institution’.19 This is based on the view that the Uruguay Round texts, and the 
‘trade insider’ community, more broadly, unambiguously adopted the new trade 
agenda defined by late 20th-century neo-liberal thinking and sought to reshape 
international trade law around it. Of course, as a matter of historical record, there is 
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no doubt that this did occur to some degree. But it seems to me that the WTO 
agreements, and the views of the WTO membership, are much more ambiguous and 
conflicted in this respect than is often suggested. For example, while the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) do contain obligations with respect to regulatory 
harmonization, these obligations are qualified in ways that reduce their practical 
significance in important ways.
20
 And while the SPS Agreement has clearly been 
influenced by a rigorous ‘sound science’ approach to risk regulation, at the same time 
there is a clear effort in the text of the agreement to permit certain kinds of 
precautionary measures and to safeguard each WTO members’ rights to regulate and 
diverse risk tolerances. Similarly, while the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
reflects a neo-liberal agenda in the sense that many of its obligations are premised on 
the de-monopolization and re-regulation of certain network service sectors, it does not 
clearly mandate those outcomes and, indeed, contains a number of flexibilities and 
carve-outs that point in the opposite direction.
21
  
None of this is news to Howse, who has written about all of these aspects of 
the WTO agreements as perceptively as anyone. The point, simply, is that we need to 
be careful before unambiguously assimilating the Uruguay Round texts, the trade 
insider community, or the WTO membership as a whole to the ideology of the 
Washington Consensus. The texts are overwhelmingly conflicted and multi-layered 
on this point, with the result that there is a great deal of textual support for the 
Appellate Body’s current approach. And the ambivalence of the texts no doubt 
reflects in part the underlying ambivalence and lack of consensus on the part of the 
membership itself. The practice since the Uruguay Round, and the response of WTO 
members to Appellate Body jurisprudence over the last twenty years, suggests an 
alternative story, in which the views of the membership as a whole remained unsettled 
and mobile in the years following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and have 
since been solidifying around something very similar to the approach that the 
Appellate Body now appears to have adopted. On my reading, then, the Appellate 
Body’s adoption of the ‘regulatory balance’ approach to the interpretation of the post-
discriminatory norms is probably best understood not as a decisive break with the 
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neo-liberal ideology of the WTO as an institution but, rather, as the product of an 
ongoing implicit intra-institutional dialogue, a dialogue in which the Appellate Body 
has acted as a de facto thought leader and in which its jurisprudence has served as a 
focal point in relation to which broader institutional commonsense has evolved. 
 
*** 
 
At this point, let me put aside the larger trajectory of the story that Howse traces and 
focus instead on the particular jurisprudential techniques and moves that he uses to 
illustrate this trajectory. The wealth of jurisprudential detail is one of the features of 
this article, giving it a rare richness and depth, and it is one of the signal strengths of 
Howse’s analysis that he can so clearly see through the particular doctrinal move in 
question to the larger function it serves for the Appellate Body as an institution. His 
list of techniques for creating judicial independence are a perfect example, ranging 
across such matters as recourse to normative resources from outside the WTO system; 
the adoption of textualism rather than teleology as a primary interpretive approach; 
emphasizing the precedential weight of its own decisions; completing the analysis; as 
well as such procedural moves as permitting private counsel.
22
 
In fact, although Howse makes it look easy, this is a much more difficult story 
to tell than it may seem. If at the level of ‘judicial policy’ there is a relatively clear 
story to tell, at the level of judicial techniques the story becomes very complex. This 
is because, for almost every jurisprudential trend that Howse correctly identifies in the 
jurisprudence, an opposing trend can also be identified. Thus, while it is true to say 
that in many cases the Appellate Body often self-consciously eschews teleological 
reasoning in order to ground its legitimacy in the text, it is also true that in other cases 
it adopts teleological reasoning to achieve a different effect.
23
 Similarly, while Howse 
is right, of course, that there is a line of SPS jurisprudence in which the Appellate 
Body applies its standard of review in a relatively deferential manner, with a view to 
the underlying regulatory balance of the agreements, there is also another line of cases 
in which the same standard of review is used to facilitate relatively intrusive 
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scrutiny.
24
 And, to offer a third example, while it is right to note that the Appellate 
Body has on occasion established and enhanced its independence by refusing to give 
particular weight to internal documents coming from WTO committees, on other 
occasions, the purposes of objectivity and impartiality appear to have been better 
served by precisely the opposite move.
25
  
None of this is inconsistent with Howse’s analysis. It is certainly true, as 
Howse argues, that the Appellate Body has sought over the last 20 years to build its 
legitimacy by marking its independence, by striving for balance and by displaying 
self-restraint. It is just that different and sometimes opposing techniques will be 
required to achieve these effects, depending on the context. Sometimes, a display of 
judicial independence will demand that the Appellate Body distance itself from 
members’ views; on others, independence will require deference to the membership. 
Sometimes an appearance of balance and objectivity will require formalism and 
textualism; sometimes it may be better served through the use of more teleological 
reasoning. And, of course, a balance needs always to be struck between the competing 
demands of judicial independence and judicial self-restraint, a balance that is likely to 
be calibrated in different ways depending on the precise circumstances of the decision 
in question.  
The Appellate Body has, it seems to me, been incredibly sensitive to this 
reality and, as a consequence, has developed a jurisprudential style specifically 
designed to maintain its flexibility and freedom to respond appropriately as the 
context changes. Indeed, this is such a prominent feature of Appellate Body 
jurisprudence that I would add ‘flexibility’ as a sixth judicial policy, adding to the five 
that Howse lists. Throughout its case law, we see the Appellate Body adopting 
reasoning that leaves questions open, refusing to tie its own hand in future cases. 
Thus, for example, we find many decisions that rely heavily on the facts of the case at 
hand
26
 as well as relatively frequent recourse to arguendo reasoning, which helps to 
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leave certain key legal questions unresolved.
27
 Elsewhere, especially in politically 
sensitive or potentially systemically important cases, we see the Appellate Body 
refusing to complete the analysis,
28
 or limiting the frame of reasoning by hewing 
closely to the content of parties’ arguments,29 or relying on its limited institutional 
mandate to avoid questions that it may feel unable to resolve legitimately.
30
 We also 
see the incremental development of complex, composite, multi-layered tests – the 
combination of the necessity test and the chapeau in GATT Article XX is the best 
example – which give the Appellate Body flexibility by enabling it to rely on one or 
another element of the test in different cases, as circumstances demand.
31
  
This flexible jurisprudential style, it seems to me, is evidence of the Appellate 
Body’s fundamentally cautious judicial sensibility, a sensibility that valorizes the 
virtues of modesty, narrowness and incrementalism over grand statements of law or 
larger integrative moves.
32
 While the virtues of this sensibility are clear, so too are its 
risks. There is no doubt that the Appellate Body’s prioritization of flexibility and 
attentiveness to context has created a body of jurisprudence that is overly complicated 
and opaque – mystifying, even, to many first-time observers. Perhaps more 
importantly, this jurisprudential style certainly leaves them open to charges of 
inconsistency and lack of discipline – as we have seen recently in the current US 
criticism of the ‘activism’ of certain Appellate Body members. While it will be clear 
that I see this criticism as fundamentally misconstruing what is driving WTO 
jurisprudence, nevertheless it is true that the Appellate Body has in part helped to set 
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the conditions in which such a criticism can flourish. Now, twenty years after its first 
decisions were adopted, a key challenge looking ahead will be to find new 
jurisprudential resources and techniques that maintain its admirable aspiration to 
modesty and caution, but without paying as high a price as it has so far at the level of 
consistency and complexity. 
 
*** 
 
Finally, let me offer some brief forward-looking reflections prompted by one of the 
most significant and insightful passages in Howse’s article in one of its concluding 
paragraphs: 
 
The equilibrium between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade liberalization 
discerned by the Appellate Body is very much a construction – one that is 
normatively stabilizing at a time when there are few agreed answers about the 
costs and benefits of globalization or the ideal shape of global economic 
governance in relationship to differing domestic policy paths. For the contestants 
in these debates on either side, this normative stabilization cannot but seem to 
have an element of the arbitrary and artificial to it. Yet it may well have 
contributed to a sense that, while the WTO appears to be stalled in its negotiating 
functions during this period, there has been some basic durability to the given 
legal framework and its enforceability.
33
 
 
This is hugely important. As recent political developments in Europe and the USA 
have made clear, we are living in a period in which the normative foundation of 
global economic integration is fundamentally contested. If Howse is right – and I 
think he is – then we can discern in the evolution of Appellate Body jurisprudence the 
development of one attempt to craft a new normative foundation for economic 
integration and a new vision for the role of institutions of international economic 
governance, which has arisen in part as a response precisely to this contestation. 
Reduced to its core, and no doubt oversimplified, this is a vision that starts 
from the position that there is a trade-off to be made between, on the one hand, the 
genuine and significant economic benefits of global integration and, on the other, its 
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political costs in the form of reduced domestic regulatory autonomy and sovereign 
control. The normative vision proposed is imagined as a new compromise between 
these conflicting demands, one that captures many of the benefits of ‘deep 
integration’, but that avoids the legitimacy problems that have proved to come with a 
full throated pursuit of regulatory harmonization and the disciplining of regulation 
through cost-benefit analysis. The compromise adopted by the Appellate Body in its 
jurisprudence is that described earlier, in which nation states retain the freedom to 
define and pursue almost any regulatory objective they see fit, but the means by 
which they choose to pursue such ends are subject to relatively strict international 
oversight from the perspectives of proportionality, rationality and good governance. 
In this compromise, global institutions associated with economic integration have 
neither the authority nor legitimacy to restrict the purposes of market regulation at the 
level of the nation state, but they do have a legitimate mandate to intervene to 
improve (perhaps even optimize) the design and administration of regulatory regimes. 
Of course, this emergent vision of the nature, purpose and direction of global 
economic integration is hardly the creation of the Appellate Body alone. But I think it 
is fair to say the WTO jurisprudence provides a very good window onto it and that the 
Appellate Body has been one important voice in its development. And, as Howse 
notes in the passage quoted above, the emergence of this new vision has been part of 
the conditions providing some degree of normative stability for the regime during 
turbulent times.  
It is here that the focus of my comments turns away from the Appellate Body 
itself, to the larger project of economic integration to which the Appellate Body is 
both contributing and responding. One of the profound virtues of this passage in 
Howse’s article is that it presents before us a hugely important set of questions about 
the adequacy of this vision. In what ways is it an acceptable compromise and in what 
ways does it fall short? Does it constitute an acceptable and potentially durable 
answer to the concerns of those who now so strongly voice their rejection of global 
economic integration? Howse’s analysis itself, it seems to me, offers the beginnings 
of an answer to these questions.  
Taken on its own terms, there is a great deal to commend this compromise. To 
the extent that there is a balance to be struck between the economic benefits and 
political costs of economic integration, the oversight role for international institutions 
suggested by the Appellate Body is vastly superior to the excessive intrusiveness that 
is contained in some extreme versions of the neo-liberal agenda of economic 
integration. To a large extent, the Appellate Body has successfully responded to the 
critiques of many who have over the past two decades raised concerns about the 
potential for WTO law to constrain overly members’ regulatory freedom. As currently 
interpreted, these constraints, while real, are within reasonable limits. Furthermore, 
and importantly, through the ‘jurisprudence of balance’, which Howse so clearly 
describes, the Appellate Body has provided a strong answer to those who were 
concerned that the WTO may be biased in favour of ‘trade values’ over ‘non-trade 
values’ in those disputes in which such values are in conflict. One of the great virtues 
of the Appellate Body’s approach has been to demonstrate that WTO law has 
sufficient resources internally to respond adequately to problems of value conflict, 
without the need always to resort to normative and other resources outside the law of 
the WTO.
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 This has been a major, and welcome, development. 
But, of course, problems remain. There will be some, for example, who will 
think that the Appellate Body has gone too far in its attempt to assuage these 
concerns. After all, to ‘preserve regulatory autonomy’ in WTO law in reality means to 
grant to WTO members the privilege to inflict harm on other states (or at least certain 
segments of their populations) in the pursuit of their regulatory values. We may 
legitimately ask whether the Appellate Body has done all it can to ensure that 
domestic regulatory process are as ‘other regarding’ as possible in this respect.35 Are 
the external costs of regulatory actions distributed fairly and borne by the most 
appropriate actors? It is not always clear that they are, nor is it clear that the Appellate 
Body has turned its attention to this aspect of the problem as directly as it might have, 
even if it may be limited in its ability to address it. One challenge for the future, then, 
may be to craft an approach that pays greater attention to the incidence of regulatory 
costs, which insists on greater responsiveness on the part of states to the external costs 
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of their regulatory choices – but without reverting to the overly intrusive model of 
compulsory regulatory harmonization and cost/benefit analysis.  
Furthermore, the present context of political discontent over economic 
globalization in both Europe and the USA highlights another potential weaknesses of 
the normative vision set out above. The core message of this vision is that economic 
integration does require giving up some degree of sovereign control but that, 
ultimately, the economic benefits are worth it, provided regulatory constraints are 
kept within certain bounds. But to those domestic constituencies who feel intensely 
the loss of political control, but who see few of the economic benefits of integration, 
this is a compromise with few, if any, attractions. Indeed, it only reinforces the 
intuition that globalization, at its base, necessarily requires populations to accept 
restrictions on their ability to determine their own destiny and reaffirms the idea that 
the state is the best and most effective site for the exercise of political control over 
economic life. The tragedy is that in many, and perhaps most, cases neither is true. 
Sometimes, collective action of some kind is the only mechanism to assert any kind of 
meaningful control and sometimes state-based control over certain economic 
activities is nothing more than a nostalgic illusion. Arguably, then, what may be 
needed to respond to the concerns of these constituencies is not a different or better 
balance between the economic benefits of globalization and its accompanying 
political costs but, rather, a different vision of integration altogether – one that 
embraces international cooperation as a means of re-asserting political control, rather 
than surrendering it. Of course, to be more than merely rhetoric, it may require a 
modified political agenda, refocused on, for example, the creation of global public 
goods or addressing the problems of harmful regulatory and tax competition. 
It seems to me that these are some of the larger questions that Howse’s 
analysis puts on the table, and while they are not the sort of issues that the Appellate 
Body is institutionally equipped to resolve, nor can it entirely ignore the larger 
context in which its jurisprudence is received and interpreted. In the end, this is 
perhaps one of the most important lessons we might wish to take from Howse’s 
article. In any body of law, at least any with the stakes of WTO law, there is an 
inevitable mutuality between jurisprudential technique, context and larger historical 
trajectories, which is crucial to understand if as scholars we want to understand the 
underlying dynamics of the law. This is difficult to capture using traditional legal 
analysis, and it is one of its immeasurable strengths of Howse’s article that it moves 
so effortlessly between the technical minutiae of WTO jurisprudence, through meso-
level analysis of ‘judicial policies’, to the larger global political dynamics of the 
project of global economic integration. In this, it is a model of scholarship to which 
many will aspire.  
